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TABLE XII
TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN DISPOSITION OF 1952-1953 REPORTED CASES
AND DATE OF FILING IN THE SUPREME COURT
Time elapsed divided Into
periods of 6 months Number of cases Percentage
6 months or less 86 29.86
12 months but more than 6 months 80 27.77
18 months but more than 12 months 53 18.40
24 months but more than 18 months 23 8.00
30 months but more than 24 months 12 4.13
36 months but more than 30 months 6 2.08
42 months but more than 36 months 5 1.74
48 months but more than 42 months 7 2.43
54 months but more than 48 months 3 1.04
60 months but more than 54 months 2 .70
66 months but more than 60 months 1 .35
72 months but more than 66 months 2 .70
78 months but more than 72 months 2 .70
84 months but more than 78 months
90 months but more than 84 months 1 .35
96 months but more than 90 months 1 .35
102 months but more than 96 months 1 .35
108 months but more than 102 months 1 .35
114 months but more than 108 months
120 months but more than 114 months 1 .35
338 months 1 .35
Totals 288 100.00
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Paul M. Hebert*
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
Important decisions by the Supreme Court in two disbarment
proceedings of widespread interest were rendered during the
1952-53 term. In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Cawthorn,'
the respondent attorney had been convicted in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under an
indictment charging him with conspiracy to corruptly influence,
obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in a crim-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 67 So. 2d 165 (La. 1953). The significance of the case is discussed in
Schillin, Highlights of the Recent Cawthorn Decision, 1 La. Bar J. 28-30
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inal prosecution for income tax evasion brought against his client.
The indictment charged the defendant and his alleged co-
conspirators with attempting to influence prospective jurors in
the tax evasion case. Following affirmance of the respondent's
conviction and sentence by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals 2 disbarment proceedings were filed against him in the
Supreme Court under Section 12, Article XIII, of the Act of
Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association based upon
the felony conviction in the federal court.3 The mentioned rule
provides that whenever a member of the bar is finally convicted
of a felony, the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
"... may present to the Supreme Court a certified or exem-
plified copy of the judgment of such conviction, and there-
upon the court may, without further evidence, if in its opin-
ion the case warrants such action, enter an order striking the
name of the person so convicted from the roll of attorneys
and concelling his license to practise law in the State of
Louisiana .. "
After exceptions filed by the respondent were overruled at
his request, a commissioner was appointed to take testimony.
The commissioner recommended respondent's suspension from
the practice for a period of five years. The matter was before the
court on exceptions by the committee to the commissioner's
report and on oppositions by the respondent to the report. In a
well-reasoned opinion by Associate Justice LeBlanc, the suspen-
sion recommendation was rejected and the respondent was dis-
barred. It was held that the commissioner had erred in prac-
tically retrying on the merits the charges made against the
attorney in the federal court proceedings. The majority of the
court reaffirmed the holdings in the two Connolly cases 4 and
concluded that the commissioner should have held himself bound
by those holdings. In the language of the court:
"What the decisions in those cases stand for, as far as is
pertinent to the present discussion, is that the conviction of
an attorney, of a felony, in either a State or Federal Court,
2. See Burton v. United States, 175 F. 2d 960, 176 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir.
1949); cert. denied Burton v. United States, 338 U.S. 909 (1950).
3. Section 12 of Article XIII of the Act of Incorporation is found in the
Rules of the Supreme Court, 21 West's La. Stat. Ann. 1950, 387-388 (follow-
ing 37:218).
4. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582
(1942) and Louisiana State Bar Association v, Connolly, 206 La. 883, 20 So. 2d
168 (1944).
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may set out a prima facie case of misconduct authorizing
disbarment and that the rule of this Court so providing in
substance, is one of evidence affecting the burden of proof
which is then placed on the defendant to go forward with
evidence at a hearing before the Commissioner and show
that he, notwithstanding the judgment of conviction, has not
been guilty of such misconduct or transgression as to warrant
his suspension or disbarment. As far as the conviction is
concerned, there is nothing which this Court can do to set
it aside. However, while it is conclusive of the attorney's
conviction, it is not conclusive as to the misconduct on which
he is sought to be suspended or disbarred. With regard to
misconduct, the conviction only gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption and the Court is then called on to decide
whether the presumption thus created, if not rebutted, is one
which convicts the defendant of such misconduct as to jus-
tify his suspension or disbarment."5
After considering at length the issues of fact raised by the
respondent to support his contention that he was convicted on
perjured testimony, the court held that the respondent had failed
to sustain the burden of rebutting the prima facie case of mis-
conduct which arose out of his conviction. As to the commis-
sioner's recommendation for a five year suspension, Justice
LeBlanc's opinion concluded:
"We cannot agree with this recommendation. This mis-
conduct growing out of the felony for which respondent was
convicted, and which he has not refuted, is of a most serious
nature and one which strikes at the very foundation of our
judicial system. It involves the grossest sort of moral turpi-
tude. A lawyer, more than any other citizen, should set the
example and be the leader in upholding the proper admin-
istration of justice in our courts and any lawyer who trans-
gresses the law by obstructing our judicial processes is
unworthy of the dignity of the profession. He merits noth-
ing less than disbarment."
In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Fournet expressed the
view that the circumstances of the case required that there be
an examination of the record on which the conviction was based.
In the view of the Chief Justice, the proper exercise of the orig-
inal and constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court involv-
5. 67 So. 2d 165, 168 (La. 1953).
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ing misconduct of members of the bar exacts such examination."
The Chief Justice did not agree that the court was limited to a
determination of the question of whether sufficient testimony had
been introduced to overcome the presumption of misconduct evi-
denced by the conviction. He construed the Connolly cases as
authorizing disbarment without further evidence after an exam-
iation of the record in the conviction and expressed the view that
such analysis was especially important in a case in which the
attorney continued to maintain strenuously that he was convicted
on perjured testimony. The dissent also pointed out that, unlike
the situation in the Connolly case in which a plea of nolo conten-
dere was filed, respondent was convicted by a jury. The Chief
Justice concluded that the majority opinion was virtually a sub-
stitution of the judgment of the jury for the determination the
Supreme Court should make as to whether there was misconduct
justifying disbarment.
When one considers the importance to society of maintaining
public confidence in the legal profession, the wisdom of the
majority opinion in placing so much weight upon the prima facie
presumption of misconduct resulting from a felony conviction
becomes apparent. Conviction of an attorney of a serious crime
undermines public confidence in the attorney and reflects unfavor-
ably upon the legal profession. As the committee pointed out in its
original brief, the average citizen would indeed find it incongru-
ous if an attorney adjudged guilty and deserving of criminal
punishment should be adjudged innocent in a disbarment pro-
ceeding and held entitled to retain his membership in the legal
profession.7 Moreover, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is re-
quired in the criminal proceedings, while the normal standard
of proof in a disbarment proceeding is merely a preponderance
of evidence to support the charges of misconduct. There is much
merit, therefore, in the rule sanctioned in the Cawthorn case. It
affords a convicted lawyer a reasonable and fair opportunity of
showing lack of misconduct by rebutting the prima facie evidence
of misbehavior which results from the judgment of conviction.
At the same time it permits the court to give full effect to an
attorney's conviction while retaining the power to prevent mis-
6. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
7. Perhaps the height of incongruity from the layman's point of view is
reflected in such decisions as In re Jones, 202 La. 729, 12 So. 2d 795 (1943)
and In re Meraux, 202 La. 736, 12 So. 2d 798 (1943) in which it has been held
that a district judge removed from office by the Supreme Court for mis-
conduct while in office cannot subsequently be disbarred from the practice of
law because of such misconduct.
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carriage of justice in an appropriate case in which the presump-
tion is rebutted. Such an instance was the second Connolly case s
in which the court decided that the respondent's evidence had
successfully rebutted the prima facie case of misconduct made out
as a result of the conviction in evidence in that case. There, how-
ever, the conviction was based on a plea of nolo contendere. As
the court had previously sustained the constitutionality of Section
12 of Article XIII of the Act of Incorporation of the State Bar
Association above quoted, 9 respondent must have been presumed
to have acted with the established jurisprudence before him. The
result reached by the court in imputing the effect of the convic-
tion to respondent did not, therefore, operate unfairly. The Chief
Justice's dissent was consistent with his previous dissents on the
constitutional issues involved.10
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Theard" disbarment
proceedings were filed against the respondent charging profes-
sional misconduct. The substance of the charges was that the
respondent attorney had in 1935, while engaged in the active
practice of law, forged and uttered certain mortgage notes with
intent to defraud. The committee charged that respondent "had
wilfully transgressed the rules of professional ethics to such an
extent that he was morally unfit to continue the practice of law."
The court overruled respondent's exceptions to the petition and
affirmed the validity of the present procedures for disciplinary
action against members of the bar. It was held that the pro-
ceeding was properly brought in the name of the Louisiana State
Bar Association through the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances without special authority from the Board of
Governors and the petition was not defective though it lacked
the signature of an officer of plaintiff association. As disbarment
proceedings in the form here brought are authorized by Rules of
the Supreme Court no additional authority was necessary.12
The contention was urged by the respondent that he had
adduced proof of his insanity at the time of the misconduct
8. 206 La. 883, 20 So. 2d 168 (1944).
9. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Leche, 201 La. 293, 9 So. 2d 566
(1942); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582
(1942).
10. In the Leche and Connolly cases, cited in note 9 supra, Justices
Higgins and Fournet both dissented.
11. 222 La. 328, 62 So. 2d 501 (1952).
12. See Rule XVII of the Supreme Court and Article XIII of the Articles
of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, Sections 4 and 11,
21 West's La. Stat. Ann. 1950, 380, 387.
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charged and that the incapacity alleged to have resulted from
such mental illness ousted the power of the court to hear the case.
This contention was rejected, the court holding that insanity is
no defense to a disbarment proceeding. Justice McCaleb in an
excellent opinion pointed out that while insanity may render a
defendant exempt from criminal responsibility and in some cases
from civil responsibility, it does not follow that insanity exon-
erates a lawyer from the consequences of his professional mis-
conduct. A good moral character is exacted of those admitted to
the bar and the court concluded that it mattered not whether
dishonest conduct in a lawyer stems from an incapacity to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong or was due to a specific crim-
inal intent. Protection to the public served by the legal pro-
fession requires such result.13 Additional exceptions of the respon-
dent based on prescription, laches and estoppel were disposed of
as being entirely without merit. The decision in the Cawthorn
and Theard cases are eminently correct and merit the approval
and support of the organized bar.
BAR ADiMISSIONS
Requirements for admission to the bar were altered in two
important respects by an amendment to Section 7, Article XII,
of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation promulgated by Rule of Court on June 2, 1953. One of
the amendments, raising the general qualifications for admission
to the bar, will have a salutary effect. The other change was
the backward step of suspending the bar examination require-
ment previously exacted of graduates of accrredited Louisiana law
schools. The result is the reinstatement of tie "diploma privilege."
Prior to the amendment, Louisiana was one of five states
with the low general educational requirement of a high school
education or its equivalent. The Louisiana State Bar Association
has for years been working for the adoption of the American Bar
Association's recommended pre-legal requirement which was
increased to three years of college work effective September 1,
1952' 14 The amended Louisiana rule adopts the requirement of
three years of college work. To have the new rule operate with-
out undue hardship to registrants who do not have the higher
13. Cited with approval was In re Patlak, 368 Ill. 547, 15 N.E. 2d 309, 116
A.L.R. 627 (1938).
14. See Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to
the Bar, Reports of the Louisiana State Bar Association for 1952, 43-47 (1952).
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qualifications and who are presently studying under the direction
of an attorney, the rule makes the effective date October 1, 1956.
After that date all applicants must have the new general require-
ment of three years' college education. This represents a marked
stiffening of bar admission requirements in Louisiana. With the
increased opportunities now available for college work the new
rule will not act as a hardship on any one and it reflects a grow-
ing appreciation of the importance of the role of the lawyer. The
skills exacted of the lawyer require a broad educational back-
ground and the new rule reflects this viewpoint. With law office
study of three years still permitted as an avenue to the bar, the
new educational requirement is an important safeguard. The
profession will generally approve of the court's action in this
respect.
Reinstatement of the "diploma privilege" was effected over
the strenuous opposition of the law schools of Loyola, Tulane and
Louisiana State Universities, as well as over the opposition of
the Louisiana State Bar Association. The proposal to eliminate
the bar examination originated with the court. Associate Justices
Hawthorne and McCaleb dissented from the order on the ground
that such a change should come only upon a request from the bar
as a whole, speaking through the Bar Association. In a brief filed
with the court the law schools urged the retention of the bar
examination as an independent determination by public author-
ity of the professional competency of applicants for admission to
the bar. Since 1921, the American Bar Association standards have
opposed the diploma privilege15 and one of the recently published
studies in the Survey of the Legal Profession has pointed out that
the American Bar Association's policy has been responsible for
the abolition of the diploma privilege in all but a few states.16
Among the states recently abolishing the "diploma privilege" are
Arkansas, South Carolina and Florida.1 7 The Louisiana Supreme
Court's action thus runs directly counter to the trend in other
states.
The argument has been advanced that suspension of the bar
examination will eliminate a discriminatory situation in which
veterans, including those serving in the Korean War, were not
15. Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements in the United States-
1952 Review of Legal Education 26 (Published by the American Bar Ass'n).
16. Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements
for Admission to the Bar 36 (1952).
17. See Sturgis, Abolition of the Diploma Privilege, 4 U. of Fla. L. Rev.
370-381 (1951).
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required to take the examination while non-veterans were forced
to take the examination. The number of veterans admitted on
motion without the necessity of taking the bar examination has
been steadily decreasing and the liberality that has been shown
to Louisiana's veterans hardly justifies the present order broad-
ening the "diploma privilege." In fact the normal situation of a
bar examination for all law school graduates was approaching a
reality and the existence of discrimination is recognized at a
rather late date considering the many years during and since
World War II in which the discrimination was much mote
marked. The diploma privilege for veterans has been more lib-
erally applied in Louisiana than elsewhere. Mistakes of policy
in that regard should not now be utilized to undermine the entire
structure of the bar examination. It is also said that Louisiana
has good law schools, and, hence, the bar examination is unneces-
sary and only serves to subject law graduates to mental pressure
over the possible stigma of failure. Certainly those who cannot
successfully cope with the pressures of a three day bar examina-
tion will be hard put to withstand the constant rush, tension and
conditions under which the lawyer must work. Moreover, the
present system of legal education in this state has been fashioned
since 1924 with the bar examination viewed as a part of the final
educational process to which the law graduate is subjected.
There are many values in the bar examination system. Compre-
hensive review is an important part of professional preparation.
The Louisiana law schools have relied upon the bar examination
to provide that comprehensive review for which there is not
adequate time at the conclusion of the three year law school
course. Abolition of the bar examination has at least the follow-
ing effects: it eliminates a check by duly constituted public
authority (the Supreme Court Examining Committee) on the
competency of a large number of persons to be admitted to the
profession; it delegates full responsibility for professional com-
petency to the law schools when it should be the joint responsi-
bility of the legal profession, the court and the law schools; it
fails to take cognizance of the efficiently working bar examina-
tion system that has been developed through the years by the
work of the Admissions Committee of the Supreme Court and the
Bar Admissions Advisory Committee, representing the law
schools; it eliminates the presence of a constant stimulus to great-
er effort on the part of the students who know they must pass a
bar examination as well as pass the course of Professor X; it
1953]
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eliminates a device whereby legal education is appraised prac-
tically through the eyes of members of the bar; it returns to the
situation existing prior to 1924 when the Legislature was con-
strained as a matter of policy to enact a statute making the bar
examination a requirement; and, finally, it rejects the consid-
ered views of professional groups who have studied the problem
of bar admissions that are involved in a "diploma privilege" and
who, on the basis of experience, have concluded that a bar exam-
ination for law school graduates is desirable. It would be un-
thinkable to allow medical school graduates to practice medicine
without passing the examination conducted by the Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners.18 The legal profession merits
similar safeguards despite the fact that Louisiana is fortunate
in the quality of work done by students in its law schools. The
broadening of the diploma privilege is, in the opinion of the
writer, a serious mistake. It should be rectified as quickly as
possible by action of the Supreme Court or through the re-
enactment of legislation similar to Act 113 of 1924. Otherwise
the "diploma privilege" will become so imbedded as to be difficult
to remove. Under the jurisprudence such legislation would con-
stitute a valid exercise of the police power. 9
Public Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Melvin G. Dakin*
During the past term the court had occasion to interpret
in Roussel v. Digby' the provision of the conservation laws pur-
suant to which a person adversely affected by an order made
by the commissioner may pursue judicial review thereof. As
18. As to the requirement of examination see La. R.S. 1950, 37:1269, 1270,
1271, 1272.
19. Ex parte Steckler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934); In re Mundy, 202 La.
41, 11 So. 2d 398 (1942) both hold that the Legislature may, in the exercise of
its police power, and in the performance of its duty to protect the public
against imposition or incompetence on the part of persons professing to be
qualified to practice the so-called learned professions, fix minimum quali-
fications or standards for admission to the bar. The exercise of that power
by the Legislature does not limit the inherent judicial power to prescribe
maximum qualifications.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Roussel v. Digby, Commissioner of Conservation, 222 La. 779, 64 So.
2d 1 (1953).
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